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GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE POST-CRISIS WORLD
1. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNANCE
The definition of terms and categories is a widely recognized problem in social sci-
ences. Researchers often work with analytically imprecise categories that are
understood and applied differently by different disciplines, schools of thought or
professions. Governance is such a rather vague category. Probably Thomas Payne
was the very first who used and characterized the concept of “good governance”
for domestic purposes:” Good Governance means the proper exercise of political,
administrative and economic rights at all levels. 
It is almost impossible to trace the origins of the use of the category “global gov-
ernance”. Many politicians, academics and the prophets in the civil society raised
the needs for world government even centuries ago. Global governance however
as a more immediate or current task or action appeared probably only during the
last decades of the 20th century. It was the dictionary of politicians or of the acad-
emic world, where this word appeared together. An American economist, Harlan
Cleveland, was one of the first scholar, who defined and used the concept of glob-
al governance, in the early 1980s as the “management of the “nobody in charge
world”. NGOs have been also playing an important role in developing the idea.
From among them, a group, called the Commission on Global governance proved
to be particularly important. 
Lawrence Finkelstein an American social scientist in his paper published in the
first issue of the journal, Global Governance in 1995 in an article “What is Global
governance”, wrote the following: “Does global mean what has been signified by
international, interstate, intergovernmental or even often Transnational? If so why
not use one of those terms, instead of choosing a more ambiguous one? Ambiguity
affects not only what is meant by global but also what is meant by governance…At
least it must be clear that it does not mean “government” or we would not say that
instead. Since the international system notoriously lacks hierarchy and govern-
A „Nagy Válság” ismét nyilvánvalóvá tette, hogy a világkereskedelem és a
nemzetközi pénzügyek globalizálódása kisiklásának elkerülése, a világrend
megvédése a széteséstől hatékonyabb, jelentősebb, rugalmasabb, globális
együttműködést, szorosabb és átgondoltabb globális kormányzást követelnek.
A válság utáni világban a globális kormányzás három, nemzeti, regionális és
globális szinten folyik, amelyek között szoros kapcsolat alakult ki. A tanul-
mány a globális gazdasági kormányzás néhány főbb kérdésével foglalkozik.
Megvilágítja, hogy a zavarnak és a nyugtalanságnak a XXI. század
világában a válságnál mélyebbek a gyökerei és szélesebbek a forrásai.
A globális kormányzásnak ezért lényegesen átfogóbb kihívásokra kell választ
adnia szélesebb keretben és hosszabb távlatban.
ment, the fuzzier word governance is used instead”1. In my book on the “Future of
Global Governance: Managing Risks and Change in the International System”,2 I
characterized global governance as less than governing but more than managing
the global system. I included all those institutions, which are setting the norms,
defining rules and implementing the multilaterally agreed policies.
2. THE LEVELS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY
The institutions of global governance are not only the multilateral organizations.
They comprise a complex system, which includes three interconnected levels:
national, regional and global. The national level is still the most important. Its deci-
sions are shaping the two other levels. In fact, the governments of the countries
decide on the mandate of the international organizations, they are playing a crucial
role in financing them. In fact, the governments decide on the main issues on the
agenda, they elect or select the leading officers of the multilateral system In the
final analysis, all these depend on the interests, values, policies and of course on
the world-order visions of the most important powers. When the identity and num-
ber of the players is changing, as for example in the early 21st Century, new chal-
lenges and opportunities emerge for the global governance process. As the world
economy is becoming increasingly multipolar, no country or bloc of countries has
the political and economic leverage to drive an international agenda. The United
States will continue to be the only truly global power for many years to come, but
it increasingly lacks the resources and domestic political determination to act as a
global leader and primary provider of global public goods. There are not yet ready
candidates however leadership and the domestic problems are dominating poli-
cies. The US is struggling with the consequences of the crisis and particularly such
issues as its large debt, unemployment and the future of the US $. Europe is preoc-
cupied with the changing interests of its members in a number of issues. This has
been reflected for example in the struggle for saving the eurozone. Japan has com-
plex political and economic problems of its own, and rising powers like China and
India – are too focused on managing the next stage in their development to take
on new international responsibilities. During the financial crisis, the G-20 looked
like a forum in which the most influential developed and developing states could
harmonize their interests for effective collective management at least in some areas
of global governance. Their actions provided the necessary financial foundation
and authority for credible solutions to global problems and coordination of poli-
cies of states and harmonizing the actions of the multilateral organizations. It is still
not clear but the probability increased that G-20 effective cooperation would be
short-lived. 
The second level of global governance is regional. This level has become partic-
ularly important since the establishment and extensions of the European Union.
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Pascal Lamy the Director general of the WTO summarized the importance
European level in the following way 
“(….) The European construction is one of the most ambitious experi-
ments to date in supranational governance, and the way Europe has
coped with the sort of challenges(…). The building of Europe is a work
in progress, and the European paradigm is itself very specific to the
conditions and pressures that prevail in Europe. Our continent was rav-
aged by two world wars and by the holocaust, leaving millions of men
and women dead and many more millions in search of peace, stability
and prosperity. One should therefore be cautious about ascribing uni-
versal values to what so far has only been a part of our European world.
Other paradigms emerging elsewhere in the world reflect different
conditions elsewhere. 
At the heart of the European project has been the creation of a space of
pooled sovereignty, a space in which the EU's members agree to govern
among themselves without having permanent recourse to internation-
al treaties. The essence of the European governance paradigm is the
coming together of national political wills to act together in the frame-
work of a common project and an institutional set-up that can make it
work. It's the combination of these three elements rather than just the
governance methods used. 
There is also the fact that Community law takes precedence over
national law, and then there's a supranational body like the European
Commission that has been given the monopoly of initiating legislation.
There is also the EU's Court of Justice whose decisions are binding on
national judges, and a parliament composed of a “senate” of member
states, the council of ministers, and a “house of representatives” elect-
ed by the European demos, the European Parliament. 
Taken together, these are the things that make the European Union
a radically new economic and political entity when it comes to interna-
tional governance”.3
Pascal Lamy has been correct in characterizing Europe as the elation for region-
al governance in the global system. There are of course many other regional inte-
gration groups and other organizations for the governance in different areas, main-
ly in trade issues” None of those organizations could develop however a compre-
hensive regional economic governance structure, due to the lack of interests,
incentives or possibilities of the member states.
In some respects, European integration offers some useful lessons also for the
third level of global governance, which is the network of multilateral organiza-
tions and cooperation regimes on global scale. The first lesson is the importance
of the rule of law and of enforceable commitments. Global governance has to be
anchored in stakeholders' commitments and in rules and regulations with mech-
anisms that deserve respect. The second lesson is the importance of coherence,
111PALÁNKAI TIBORT KÖSZÖNTJÜK
3 Pascal Lamy: Global Governance is a challenge for democracy (but an EU opportunity). Europe's
World, Spring 2010.
which must start at home and also includes multiple accountability. The third les-
son for global governance is respect for the principle of subsidiarity; the interna-
tional system should not be overburdened with issues better dealt with at the
local, regional or national level. The fourth lesson is related to legitimacy.
National governments need to be held accountable by their voters, political par-
ties, civil society, parliaments or citizens for their behavior in international orga-
nizations. 
On the third level of global governance, there are three main institutional pil-
lars. The first pillar is a strong, legitimate, executive authority capable of taking
binding decisions on matters of international peace and security. The UN Security
Council plays that role. The second pillar is a set of treaty-based institutions with
broad membership, in which all states can debate issues openly, negotiate basic
ground rules, and mobilize resources to assist the design, delivery, and implemen-
tation of global public goods. Among the most important of such entities are the
United Nations, the international financial institutions, and the World Trade
Organization. The third pillar is a network of informal, agenda-setting bodies, in
which the leaders of powerful states can meet to focus high-level political atten-
tion, coordinate policy responses, and build momentum for action within national
governments and multilateral institutions. From among the different “G”s the G8
became the most important informal group in the 20th century. It has been estab-
lished in the mid-seventies, when the heads of government of the world's six major
industrial democracies – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West
Germany, Italy, and Japan – gathered in Rambouillet, France in 1975. Their initial
impetus was to improve macroeconomic coordination amid the turbulence caused
by the introduction of floating exchange rates, the Arab oil embargo, and the ensu-
ing global recession. Canada was added in the following year and the new Russian
State in 1998. During the first decade of the twenty-first century the G8's agenda
expanded to include cooperation on development, global health, counterterror-
ism, crime prevention efforts, and peacekeeping, nonproliferation. In 1999, in the
wake of the Asian financial crisis, a new Group of Twenty finance ministers' net-
work has been established with the aim to intend to extend economic dialogue to
the largest developing countries. Its role suddenly became centrally important in
the context of the Great Crisis.
It was necessary to restore the market confidence and global financial stability
as fast as possible and avoid the collapse of the global financial system. In order to
achieve these goals that far-unparalleled policy coordination was necessary among
major developed and the most important emerging states. G8 had limited member-
ship. The United Nations had limited power, with slow and fragmented decision
making capacity. The International Monetary Fund was mistrusted by developing
countries because of its domination by the traditional economic powers, and the
well known consequences of the Washington Consensus. The easiest solution “at
hand” was the upgrading of the G20 to the level of heads of states or prime-minis-
ters and to start organizing regular summits. During the Pittsburgh summit G20
was designated as the “premier forum” for international economic cooperation.
The most important global organization, in fact, the center of global governance
is the United Nations, with its Security Council and the comprehensive system of
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specialized agencies, programs, committees and commissions.4 These institutions
are functioning in practically all the areas of human actions, starting from the very
early stage of family planning and human existence, education and health,
through, global processes of output, consumption, cooperation. In global econom-
ic governance the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO, the BIS and the different
Gs are playing a crucial role. After the Asian Financial Crisis the G20, as a group of
the most important states of the world has become a very important forum on
global level. The global financial and economic crisis, which is increasingly called
as the “Great Crisis” by the press and many economists, resulted in the transforma-
tion of this group into a kind of a global “steering committee” for the management
of the global multilateral efforts. 
As in the case of national or in fact any governance activities, there are four
stages of the process: (I) agenda setting, (ii) policy options definition, (iii) decision
on actions, and (iv) implementation. Emphasis is put on the third stage. This is
probably the most difficult and the influence of the conflicting interests is the
greatest. Virtually all issues of some global interest can be put on the agenda of at
least one committee of the UN, or of other international organizations. The deci-
sions on the implementation and its process require consensus, majority support
or at least the active political and financial involvement of some important power.
One may add on national level a fifth stage, evaluation of effectiveness. On global
level it is a rather difficult task to measure the effectiveness or the success of glob-
al governance system and its actions. These must be related to the character of the
problems the mandate of the institutions also from the perspectives of the interna-
tional beneficiaries and losers.
3. THE “GREAT CRISIS” AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM
This paper is dealing with some of the main issues of global economic governance
in the post-crisis world. One must try to answer at first to a rather difficult ques-
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tion: how far is the global economy from the crisis? According to the analysts of the
UN, the global financial and economic crisis technically ended in the third quarter
of 2009, but the recovery proved to be fragile and uneven.5 Unemployment, glob-
al imbalances, high level of indebtedness continue to drag the world economy. 
According to the 2011 Financial Stability Report of the IMF. There has been a
two-track global recovery – with advanced countries growing much more slowly
than the rest of the world – became a major policy challenge. The longer term
prospects for a slow growth of advanced economies and the continued weakness
in their fiscal balances have raised the market's sensitivity to debt sustainability
risks. The evident links between weak balance sheets of government and banking
sectors have led to renewed pressures in funding markets in the euro area and
widening strains.6 The last updated version of the 2012 Global Financial Stability
Report in October found an increased risks to the global financial system, with the
euro area crisis the principal source of concern. The report urged policymakers to
act now to restore confidence, reverse capital flight, and reintegrate the euro zone.
In both Japan and the United States, steps are needed toward medium-term fiscal
adjustment. On the other truck, the emerging market economies have successfully
navigated global shocks thus far, but need to guard against future shocks while
managing a slowdown in growth”.7
There reports have been dealing mainly with the short and medium term
processes and problems. Global governance must take into account however also
the long term changes and their consequences..
The turbulence and the distress of the world of the early 21st Century have
deeper roots and broader sources than the crisis. First of all, major long term shifts
changed the structure of the national economies. From among the sectoral shifts,
directly related to the crisis, the most important change has been the fast increase
of the financial sector and the expansion of the “paper economy”. This category
has been probably used first by a famous economist of Polish origin, Michael
Kaleczki, who described it as the financial deepening, the securitization, the
increasing role of social security pension and health insurance institutions and ser-
vices and contrasted it with the shrinking “real economy”. The paper economy is
that part of the national or the global economic system, where there is no materi-
al production and it is dominated by the movements of money, stocks, bonds and
other financial instruments. During the past 25-30 years there has been an
extremely fast growth of the paper economy. Since the 1980s it has increased three
times faster, than the “real economy”: industry, agriculture, the related services,
transport, communication, commerce. The spread of the paper economy stimulat-
ed the unprecedented growth of the global financial centers. In the medieval peri-
od “city states” emerged as the centers of trade. In the 20th century important cen-
ters of global money trading emerged, which concentrated stocks and commodity
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exchanges, private financial institutions. During the last decades of the century,
they became the global concentrations of the paper economy. The main actors in
these centers were financial conglomerates, investment and commercial banks
insurance companies, underwriters, broker houses etc. These centers, like London,
New York, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Singapore, Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam,
Geneva, Dubai, etc are not only connected by the mobility of capital, but through
the interconnectedness of the stock exchanges they are functioning 24 hours.
They play a crucially important role in speculation and also in the rapid spread of
panics. These centers became very important also in the national economies. The
London center is responsible for 15 per cent of UK GDP.
All these changes paved the road for the growth of the paper economy and pro-
moted an unprecedented degree of speculation. Especially in advanced economies
such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the financial sector has account-
ed for an unsustainable share of corporate profits and profit growth. While the
paper economy and the real economy is interconnected both in national and inter-
national framework, the vitality of the real economy - the economy that most peo-
ple depend upon for their livelihood has been undermined. During a period of
strong global growth, growing capital flows, and prolonged stability, market partic-
ipants sought higher yields without an adequate appreciation of the risks and
failed to exercise proper due diligence. The instability and volatility of the paper
economy can devalue the economic base of real lives, or in more macro-scenarios
can lead to the collapse of national and regional economies rather fast.
An outstanding British political-economist Susan Strange called this unstable
system “casino capitalism”, referring to the views of Keynes. In her book, “Casino
Capitalism” Susan Strange likened the Western financial system to a vast casino. As
in a casino, the world of high finance offers the players a choice of games. Instead
of roulette, blackjack, or poker, there is dealing to be done – the foreign-exchange
market and all its variations; or in bonds, government securities or shares. In all
these markets you may place bets on the future by dealing forward and by buying
or selling options and all sorts of other recondite financial inventions. Some of the
players – banks especially – play with very large stakes. There are also many quite
small operators. There are tipsters, too, selling advice, and peddlers of systems to
the gullible. And the croupiers in this global finance casino are the big bankers and
brokers. They play, as it were, “for the house.” It is they, in the long run; who make
the best living. She goes on to observe that the big difference between ordinary
kinds of gambling and speculation in financial markets is that one can choose not
to gamble at roulette or poker, whereas everyone is affected by “casino capitalism.”
What goes on in the back offices of banks and hedge funds is apt to have sudden,
unpredictable and unavoidable consequences for individual lives. 
The characteristics of the Great Crisis have been shaped by the dominance of
the “paper economy” which has become the most globalized part of the world
economy through the global interconnectedness of the financial institutions, mar-
kets and by the other actors of “casino capitalism”. The financial crisis quickly
spread to the real economy, chiefly because of four factors: the credit crunch,
wealth destruction and the shrinking disposable incomes, the decline in world
trade and worsening expectations for the evolution of economic activity. 
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The serious, wide-ranging yet differentiated impacts of the Great Crisis across
the globe will not disappear for a long time. Such problems as unemployment,
poverty and hunger or the reduced public confidence in financial institutions, the
reduced ability to maintain social safety nets and provide other social services,
such as health and education will be haunting in the global system for a long time
to come. The crisis certainly aggravated the employment problems on our globe.
Economic growth in many countries over the decades, preceding the financial and
economic crisis, did not produce employment opportunities corresponding to the
fast increase of people in the working age groups on global scale. The crisis aggra-
vated also the problems of poverty. There is another important long term issue: did
the Great Crisis reduced the long term growth potential of the developed world?
There are different estimates by different international organizations and aca-
demic experts about the global financial losses attributed to the crisis.8 Most of the
massive destruction of global financial wealth concentrated in the developed
countries. The total loss between 2007–2010 was estimated at US$ 50 trillion by
the experts of the Bank for International Settlements. It was roughly equivalent to
the world's GDP in 2008. 
Although the total costs of the crisis, due to the GDP decline and the direct loss-
es due to the crisis will take years find out, it is already clear that the world has suf-
fered enormous damages.
5. NEW PROBLEMS AND TASKS IN THE SYSTEM OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATION
IN THE POST-CRISIS WORLD
Strauss-Kahn, the former managing director of IMF justified it by the Great Crisis,
that it has become necessary again to deal with the issues of global governance: 
“The good news is that global governance has been renewed by the cri-
sis. Led by the G20, country came together to face common challenges
with common solutions focusing on the global common good. We saw
this in monetary policy, with coordinated interest rate cuts, with swap
lines between the Fed and many other central banks, and the decision
to adopt unconventional monetary policy measures. We also saw this in
fiscal policy, where countries with fiscal space delivered a 2 percent of
GDP global fiscal stimulus, as the IMF had advised (…).Thus we have so
far avoided a second Great Depression, a threat that was on many minds
after the fall of Lehman Brothers. This exemplary cooperation will go
down in history as the first time that governments representing billions
of men and women were able to work together to tackle a global dan-
ger (…).The crisis also prompted financial sector reform. Aware of the
errors that caused the crisis, the FSB, together with the IMF and other
institutions, is leading this agenda (…). The recent Basle III accord on
banking regulation is a major step in the right direction and should
deliver a significant qualitative and quantitative improvement in bank
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capital. The next step is to deal with the regulation of non-bank finan-
cial institutions, which played such an important role in the crisis.”9
The global crisis has been an important challenge for practically all the institu-
tions of multilateral cooperation as the world has moved into a more uncertain
phase of global interconnectedness with the dangers of mutual vulnerabilities.
During the crisis the restructuring, extension and central role of the G20 in the
global governance process has been probably the most important “innovation” in
the institutional framework of multilateral cooperation in the 21st century. The dif-
ferent measures, coordinated in the G20 group permitted to avoid the great
depression. The G20 group, which has been created on the occasion of the Asian
crisis in 1999 became the prime grouping of global economic governance ten
years later. During the acute phase of the crisis, at the first summit in Washington
DC in November 2008, the members 'agreed a series of measures and a joint Action
Plan for dealing with the crisis, including measures to reinvigorate their own
economies (without damaging global trade), to regulate global finance, to assist
the poorest countries affected by the crisis and to reform global institutions. At the
follow-up to the first summit in Washington in London in April 2009 – the slogan
was: 'A global crisis requires a global solution', The communiqué indicated that the
fiscal authorities and central banks will implement the largest fiscal and monetary
stimulus and the most comprehensive support programme for the financial sector
in modern times.' (It was indeed an unprecedented and concerted fiscal expan-
sion, amounted as a total 27 per cent of the global GDP in 2008). The most impor-
tant institutional decisions of the G20 included the much broader mandate and
increased possibilities of IMF and the coordination of certain national crisis man-
agement measures. It has become evident however that the major state actors had
no comprehensive vision. Bailouts and mainly short term stimulating measures
have been in the center of policies. Most of the strong commitment to take the ini-
tiative and carry the responsibility for implementing those changes, which could
manage and reduce the sources of global risks and improve the security of the
financial system on longer term have not been materialized so far. After the sum-
mit in Pittsburgh, when it was clear that the imminent disaster has been avoided,
with the global economy on the mend, the temptation for leaders to focus once
more on their domestic problems and interests naturally grew stronger. As a result,
there was a grave risk that the G20 would become a largely irrelevant institution.
The Seoul summit however indicated that the post-crisis world would bring a num-
ber of new problems. One of them has been the danger of global currency war in
the form of competitive devaluations. The increase of long term indebtedness of
many developed countries has been an other adverse consequence of the crisis,
reflecting not only national stability but also the instability of the global financial
system. 
As far as the post crisis world is concerned, the Great Crisis proved that the new
interrelations which developed between the domestic and international sources of
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growth, between the old and new centers of industry, services, trade and techno-
logical development require radical changes in the institutions, instruments and
efficiency of global economic governance. Due to the central importance of the
global financial sector, the most urgent tasks have been formulated in that area.
They include the appropriate collective management of risk factors particularly in
those processes and activities, which are related to the imbalances and caused
already or could be resulting in major global crises in the coming decades.
Effective policies and actions are needed for the long-term stabilization of the
financial sector on national, regional and global level, the easing dangers and risks
related to the global pressure of the still increasing indebtedness, avoiding curren-
cy wars. Most probably the global pressures will increase for the development of
new global reserve currency in the multipolar world. The reduction of depen-
dence on the traditional reserve units and particularly the US $ is also a crucial
issue in the post-crisis debates All those measures and the strengthening the key
multilateral institutions in the financial system. 
It will be a very difficult task to reform of the global financial system and devel-
op mutually agreed rules in order to avoid the repetition of future financial crises,
and make the system safer on macro and micro level with institutional changes,
macro- and micro prudential measures. On the bases of the G20 summits declara-
tions, one could notice a likely change of approach and scope in the regulation and
oversight of national financial systems. It has become clear too, that alongside
national regulation systems,, while there is a need for a global regulatory frame-
work with minimum standards and some control or oversight of global operations
of systemically important financial institutions, the probability to establish a
stronger international regulatory system is rather low. There is a degree of consen-
sus regarding the need to implement effective global early warning mechanisms,
and this will require the combined experience and knowledge of a wide range of
institutions and actors.
As for the private institutions are concerned, the Basel oversight institutions
started also working also on long term measures for the strengthening the banks,
insurance companies, and improving their transparency and security. From among
the measures, the new Basel rules are of utmost importance in terms of capital
requirements, in terms of liquidity monitoring, and all what is the core of the new
banking supervision. The rules are not only dealing with the banks themselves; it
is the full body of the system the non-bank financial institutions, the money and
security markets 
There are proposals on the table for monitoring and supervising both the cre-
ation and the propagation of complex financial instruments, requiring the greatest
transparency in the markets where they are traded. As for the latter, the idea will
be to cover all market participants, be they banks, hedge funds or credit rating
institutions. Similarly, a way will be found to bring the “shadow” banking system
into the orbit of regulatory principles and oversight in the new regulatory land-
scape.
In view of this, it has been suggested that special drawing rights (SDRs) and the
International Monetary Fund could play a stronger role in the new international
reserves system.
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6. THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL TRADE REGIME.
The management of the global trade regime is also a crucial task of global econom-
ic governance the multilateral trading system is at a fundamental crossroads.
Unilateral trade liberalization has been strong over the last two decades as states
have reduced barriers to trade and investment across most sectors of their
economies; but the process has slowed over the last couple of years. The financial
and economic crisis resulted in a growing opposition to trade liberalization
increased the demand for protectionism to protect key national businesses and
jobs. Most members of the WTO kept so far the worst domestic protectionist pres-
sures under control The regulation of the financial system and the governance of
the trade regime require different policy responses but to solve the problems in
one domain it is necessary to solve them in the other. The difficulties with conclud-
ing the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations demonstrate not only the
difficulties of conducting multilateral trade negotiations in the 21st century but
also expose serious fault lines in the contemporary architecture of trade gover-
nance in particular and global economic governance more generally. The recent
trend amongst larger countries to go outside of the WTO to reach trade deals car-
ries the risk of undermining the fabric of inclusive, fair and stable institutional
arrangements that underpin international trade. 
Both the global financial system and the trade regime are very important for the
moderation of poverty and the promotion of employment.
One should not exclude the global eco- system from the tasks of economic gov-
ernance. All its aspects are interrelated with global production and consumption,
finances and trade. At this stage the issues related to the climate change are in the
center of international efforts. It is essential to find more effective multilateral
means to halt global warming based on institutional systems that recognize the
interdependence between countries (and the differentiated role each of them has
played in its development), between public, private and social actors. Neither the
Copenhagen meeting nor the Cancun conference yielded the results hoped for.
Although the debate was carried forward, the Copenhagen Agreement, which is
not binding, was called into question by many countries and will need to be
reviewed and ratified by member States to increase countries' commitment to it, at
the same time as a more transparent and inclusive negotiating process is devel-
oped. Many issues in the international approaches to achieving climate security
remained open also after RIO+20. 
One of the often-neglected conditions of global governance is the necessary
data and the quality of analysis. There is a vast array of financial and economic sta-
tistics and the processing power to crunch them. As Claudio Borio of the BIS puts
it, “The main reason why crises occur is not lack of statistics but the failure to inter-
pret them correctly and to take remedial action.”
Policymakers, governments, institutions are not necessarily equipped with the
best knowledge for understanding the meaning of the data from the point of view
of the influence of different categories in the governance system. There is not only
an information gap but also an intellectual or knowledge gap between the differ-
ent levels, governments, and international organizations. For all the effort expend-
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ed on data gaps, the constant evolution and footloose nature of the financial sys-
tem complicates matters hugely. As bank whizz-kids dream up new products, it will
be hard for officials to keep up. Indeed, there is a good case that new financial tech-
niques are created precisely because regulators cannot spot or understand them
and therefore do not penalize them for being risky
Most of the above mentioned problems and tasks have been discussed also in
different summits of G20. It has become also evident during these negotiations,
that the approaches and policies of the main centers of the global system are again
influenced more strongly by domestic interests and considerations than by the
needs of global governance in the post crisis era. 
7. SOME FUTURE PROBLEMS
Still, the restructuring, extension and central role of the G20 in the global gover-
nance process has been probably the most important long term consequence of
the crisis for the institutional framework of multilateral cooperation. The most
important decision on the future role of IMF, on harmonizing national policy mea-
sures and many other matters have been taken in its “minilateral” framework. The
management of the crisis has been an important proof for the positive role of coor-
dinated actions in its framework. 
It is a very important issue, to what extent G20 will remain the magic formula
or “the magic forum” to promote global progress toward the establishment of
effective global governance or more moderately a global economic governance sys-
tem? Past debates and efforts proved the difficulties in reforming “the third, level
of global governance”, the multilateral organizations. It is not clear at all, to what
extent the lessons gained during the crisis will change the interests and attitudes
of the governments toward the radical improvement of multilateral institutions
and thus the G20 could become a driving force of reforms within the United
Nations and other international organizations. Some governments, NGOs and ana-
lysts consider it as a new undemocratic “great power” instrument which may
undermine the democratic structure of the UN system and therefore they consid-
er it only as a temporary structure, for the management of the Great Crisis.
It is evident that the role of G20 in shaping a realistic and relevant global agen-
da, as well as providing a forum in which the world's most powerful actors can
reach preliminary agreement on constructive approaches to common global prob-
lems depends as much on the “political will” of the main global powers as of any
multilateral institutions. It is also evident that the G20 will never replace the World
Organization and it's specialized programs and agencies (which have legitimacy
and accumulated not only invaluable technical expertise but also implementation
capacity). It can be important group, which can support the UN, as a “preparatory
forum” for global negotiations, consensus building on important global issues and
on different institutional and policy reform measures and offer a decisive financial
and intellectual contribution to the analytical, normative and implementation
capability of an evolving global governance, and within this, economic governance
system. 
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The other danger is, that some politicians or academics will either “oversell” the
G20, and go beyond the realistic expectations about its global governance poten-
tial, or consider it as a meaningless or temporary arrangement for managing the
crisis.. It is important to understand, that the members of G20 are powers on dif-
ferent levels of development, size and techno-economic potentials with diverse
concrete goals and interests. They may share problems and some priorities in the
global economy, but may also disagree on the implications and also on the tasks
how to resolve the problem, and on how to share burdens in addressing it.
The increasing multipolarity of the world will demand probably multiple insti-
tutional arrangements in the system of global economic governance in finances,
trade, employment, environmental degradation, terrorism, rising crime, urban
decay, drug abuse, and so forth. It will not make the governance process smoother
or easier in the race between implementing ever-increasing ways to improve the
human condition and the seemingly ever-increasing complexity and scale of the
system. What directions global economic governance should take? How to pre-
serve a relatively open, competitive world economy and at the same time satisfy the
demands of the citizens for protecting jobs, national social values, welfare systems,
small and medium size firms, the rights of the consumers and the ecological sys-
tem? How could sustainable development reduce the gaps caused by the growing
inequalities between and within the countries? Is the system of the European
Union sustainable with the increasing differences within the single market in
development levels, incomes, institutional capabilities and political philosophies?
The institutional reforms in the final analysis depend also on the political process,
in the center of which global peace and security are vitally important. Without rel-
evant, harmonized global policies, that are based on changing values, supported by
most of the people and implemented through governments, corporations, educa-
tion systems, NGOs, churches, the United Nations systems, and other international
organizations, global governance will remain only a dream of its advocates. 
The Great Crisis made the future path of the world even more unpredictable. It
has increased on one hand, the dangers of long term global stagnation, resulting in
protectionism, trade wars and disintegration. At the same time it has opened new
possibilities for collective actions. In this decade the fallout from the crisis will be
severe. People have been thrown into a deep sense of insecurity; misery and hard-
ship increased for many poorer people everywhere. All these is a fertile soil for fas-
cist, right wing populist, xenophobic groups, who will surely try to take advantage
of people's fear and anger for their ends. The political process became more divid-
ed, new sources of discord emerged which is also reflected in the declining rele-
vance and the growing ineffectiveness of many institutions. The role of social sci-
entists is particularly important at this stage in promoting the better understand-
ing of the complex problems of the post-crisis world and in the search for a new
vision and innovative institutional forms and solutions in the global governance of
the 21st Century. 
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